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I. INTRODUCTION
Some prosecutors have been criticized for discussing their cases
in the public media,1 but not Special Counsel Robert Mueller. Fol-
lowing his appointment to probe the connection between Russia and
the Trump presidential campaign,2 he gave no interviews. His of-
fice's web page on the Department of Justice website, linking to
public filings, was unilluminating.3 He did not hold press confer-
ences following indictments after defendants were convicted or sen-
tenced, or after submitting his final report to the Attorney General.
4
Nor does it appear that Mueller's office "leak[ed]" information by
speaking to reporters off the record.
5
* Louis Stein Chair and Director, Stein Center for Law and Ethics, Fordham Univer-
sity School of Law.
1. See infra notes 27-36 and accompanying text.
2. Appointment of Special Counsel to Investigate Russian Interference with the 2016
Presidential Election and Related Matters, Order No. 3915-201742 (Op. Att'y Gen., May 17,
2017).
3. See Special Counsel's Office, U.S. DEP'T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/sco (last vis-
ited Feb. 26, 2018). The webpage lists cases where charges were brought and provides links
to court filings in those cases, a link to the Order appointing Mueller, and a link to State-
ments of Expenditures. Id.
4. If not routine, prosecutors' press conferences following indictments and convictions
in high-profile cases are certainly common. See Bennett Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty of
Silence, 79 ALB. L. REV. 1183, 1193 (2016) ("The press conference has become ... a fixture in
the criminal justice system .... ").
5. See, e.g., Dan Janison, At the Trump-term Midpoint, Another Volatile Year Awaits,
NEWSDAY (Dec. 30, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.newsday.com/long-island/columnists/dan-
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Mueller was described in the Washington Post as "a man who sel-
dom speaks and is rarely seen.., omnipresent and absent, inescap-
able but elusive."6 His reputation for keeping a low profile as Spe-
cial Counsel spread internationally. Before his team tried Paul
Manafort in mid-2018, an English-language newspaper in Armenia
described Mueller as "Sphynx-like" and observed: "The only public
voice he has had so far is through its court filings. In fact, he has
been so scarce in the public's view that most media outlets are run-
ning the same series of photographs taken as he walked the halls of
the US Capitol back in June 2017."
7
One might wonder whether Mueller was reticent to a fault. For-
mer Independent Counsel Ken Starr, who investigated President
Clinton, seemed to think so. Commenting on Mueller's investiga-
tion, Starr expressed the view that federal prosecutors' obligation
of accountability to the public ordinarily calls on them to speak
more freely about their work.
8
Using Special Counsel Mueller's investigation as a case study-
indeed, as a study in contrast-this essay considers prosecutors' re-
lationship with the media. It identifies some law enforcement-re-
lated reasons why, in limited circumstances, prosecutors' offices
might discuss their investigations and prosecutions outside of judi-
cial proceedings. But this essay challenges the idea that prosecu-
tors' duty of accountability requires them generally to discuss ongo-
ing cases in the public media.9
janison/janison-trump-2019-1.25111666 (observing "[t]he famously leakproof Russia investi-
gation by special counsel Robert Mueller generates the most suspense"); see also Nicholas
Fandos & Noah Weiland, As a Rapt City Holds its Breath for Mueller, Spin Machines Whir,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2019, at Al ("Real information-actually, any information at all from
Mr. Mueller's astonishingly leak-free team-is almost nonexistent.").
6. Roxanne Roberts, The Elusive, Inescapable Mueller, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2018, at
Col.
7. Anthony Zurcher, Sparks Fly in FBI Agent's Trump Testimony, YEREPOUNI NEWS
(July 13, 2018), https://www.yerepouni-news.com/2018/07/13/sparks-fly-in-fbi-agents-trump-
testimony/.
8. Roberts, supra note 6 (quoting Starr: "A federal prosecutor wields important powers
and thus should always be held accountable by the American people. That accountability
carries with it, in my view, a role for providing public information ... without transgressing
important limitations-especially the protection of grand jury secrecy."); see also Bernard
Shaw et al., Impeachment Hearings: Clinton Attorney Kendall Questions Ken Starr; David
Schippers Paints Starr in a Favorable Light (CNN Live Event/Special broadcast Nov. 19,
1998, 8:30 PM) (quoting Starr: "I think it is the duty of the prosecutor to combat the dissem-
ination of misinformation as long as the prosecutor can do that without violating his or her
obligations under rule 6(e). And that's the position ... of the Justice Department.").
9. The focus of this essay is prosecutors' recourse to the public media in their official
capacity. It does not address whether, in their personal capacity, individual prosecutors have
legitimate reasons to discuss their or their offices' work. With respect to prosecutors speak-
ing extrajudicially on their own behalf, see Emily Anne Vance, Note, Should Prosecutors Blog,
Post, or Tweet?: The Need for New Restraints in Light of Social Media, 84 FORDHAM L. REV.
367 (2015).
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II. THE RUSSIA INVESTIGATION AS A STUDY IN CONTRAST
Mueller's approach was a throwback to the days when it was con-
sidered unprofessional to try one's case in the press.10 Although
contemporary rules of professional conduct restrict what trial law-
yers may say about their cases outside formal judicial filings and
proceedings,11 the rules now leave considerable room for advocates
to try to exploit the public media to their clients' advantage. One
provision, Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6, forbids advo-
cates from making public statements that "will have a substantial
likelihood of materially prejudicing" a trial,12 but recognizes that
many public statements will not taint a jury.13 Another provision,
Rule 3.8(f), admonishes prosecutors in particular not to make "ex-
trajudicial comments that have a substantial likelihood of height-
ening public condemnation of the accused.' 14 But the rule does not
address prosecutors' public comments that do not add to the defend-
ant's embarrassment-including comments that vilify uncharged
third parties. The rule also includes an exception allowing prose-
cutors to vilify a defendant if the prosecutors are discussing the na-
ture and extent of their own actions and their comments serve "a
10. See CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 20 (AM. BAR ASS'N 1908) (stating: "Newspaper
publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation may interfere with a fair trial
in the Courts and otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice. Generally they are
to be condemned."); see also GLEASON L. ARCHER, ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE LAWYER 200
(1910) ("If a lawyer, either through a desire for personal notoriety, or with an intent to injure
the adverse party, gives out facts or allegations of facts that should properly be reserved until
the trial day, he is guilty of improper conduct."); see generally Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., "May it
Please the Camera, . . . I Mean the Court"-An Intrajudicial Solution to an Extrajudicial
Problem, 39 GA. L. REV. 83, 95 (2004) (describing ABA's position in the early 20th century
"that lawyer commentary regarding cases should be limited to the confines of the courtroom
only").
11. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.6, 3.8(f) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2018); see
also generally Brown, supra note 10; Kevin Cole & Fred C. Zacharias, People v. Simpson:
Perspectives on the Implications for the Criminal Justice System: The Agony of Victory and
the Ethics of Lawyer Speech, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1627, 1638-39 (1996); Laurie L. Levenson,
Prosecutorial Sound Bites: When Do They Cross the Line?, 44 GA. L. REV. 1021, 1030-32
(2010); Abigail H. Lipman, Note, Extrajudicial Comments and the Special Responsibilities of
Prosecutors: Failings of the Model Rules in Today's Media Age, 47 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 1513,
1525-26 (2010); Peter Andrew Malanchuk, The Court of Public Opinion: Did Former Attorney
General John Ashcroft Violate Ethics Rules Regarding Extrajudicial Statements and If So,
Why Was He Not Sanctioned?, 32 J. LEGAL PROF. 237, 239-42 (2008); Scott M. Matheson, Jr.,
The Prosecutor, the Press, and Free Speech, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 865, 875-77 (1990); Vance,
supra note 9, at 375-76.
12. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.6(a).
13. See id. at r. 3.6(b); see also id. at r. 3.6 cmt. 4.
14. Id. at r. 3.8(f).
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legitimate law enforcement purpose."15 Courts sanction prosecu-
tors infrequently for violating these rules.
16
Advocates do not generally discuss their cases publicly, because
the public usually would not be interested and, in any event, the
pitfalls often outweigh the benefits to the client. But in high-profile
cases, lawyers sometimes exploit the leeway afforded by the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct to speak in the press and social me-
dia.17 If a lawyer lacks the skill to do so effectively, the lawyer can
hire a public relations specialists to provide assistance.
18
Mueller's example offers an interesting case study in which to
consider why prosecutors resort to the public media and, in partic-
ular, to consider Starr's view that commenting on ongoing cases is
necessary as a matter of prosecutorial accountability.19 As a case
study, Mueller's investigation serves as a study in contrast in at
least the following five respects.
First, and most obvious, is the stark contrast with the exuberant
use of public media by both the subjects and the targets of Mueller's
investigation, as well as their lawyers. President Trump, in partic-
ular, used both social media and traditional media to attack
Mueller and discredit his investigation. Trump maintained a
steady barrage of tweets, asserting, for example, that the investiga-
tion is "[t]he single greatest Witch Hunt in American History,"20
and that "Mueller is a conflicted prosecutor gone rogue."21 One of
Trump's lawyers, Rudolph Giuliani, went on the air to disassociate
Trump from the crimes for which Trump's former aides were con-
victed, and to join in his client's attacks on the legitimacy of
15. Id.
16. See generally, e.g., In re Brizzi, 962 N.E.2d 1240, 1249 (Ind. 2012); Att'y Grievance
Comm'n v. Gansler, 835 A.2d 548, 574-75 (Md. 2003); Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Sims, 574
S.E.2d 795, 801 (W. Va. 2002).
17. See Brown, supra note 10, at 86 ("There can be no question that high-profile cases
are almost routinely tried in the media .... ").
18. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321,
323 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
19. See Roberts, supra note 6.
20. William Goldschlag & Dan Janison, Will Trump Have Answers for Mueller's Ques-
tions? 'We'll See., NEWSDAY (Jan. 11, 2018, 8:19 AM), https://www.newsday.com/long-island/
trump-russia-mueller-daca-iran-1.16075371 (quoting Donald J. Trump (@realDonald
Trump), TWITTER (Jan. 10, 2018), 7:14 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/9511
09942685126656?lang=en).
21. See David Jackson & Kevin Johnson, President Calls Mueller 'Rogue'Prosecutor in
Manafort Case, POST-CRESCENT, Nov. 28, 2018, at B2 (quoting Donald J. Trump (@real-
DonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 27, 2018, 4:30 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/sta-
tus/1067395266511347713?lang=en).
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Mueller's work.22 His acknowledged objective was to sway the pub-
lic against the possibility of impeachment.
23
Second, Mueller's approach stood in a marked contrast to how
some other federal prosecutors have publicly discussed their high-
profile cases at early stages when the defendant was still entitled
to a trial at which he will be presumed innocent. For example, dur-
ing the investigation of President Clinton, Starr and his office spoke
with reporters on the record and, some alleged at the time, off the
record, by way of "leaking" information about he investigation's
progress.24 In cases of public interest, it is not unusual for prosecu-
tors to issue press releases and conduct press conferences announc-
ing an indictment, in order to explain the public filing in a way that
is more accessible to the public and to provide quotable sound bites
or a visual for the televised news.25 At later stages, prosecutors
sometimes comment on significant events that occurred in the
course of the proceedings.
26
As a United States Attorney in the 1980s, Rudolph Giuliani was
criticized for his and his office's accessibility to the press.27 Giuliani
22. For example, Giuliani accused Mueller's office of unethical conduct. See, e.g., Sheetal
Sukhija, Rudy's Rudimentary Rant: Masking Fears with Mueller-Bashing, BIG NEWS
NETWORK (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.bignewsnetwork.com/news/258494813/rudys-rudimen-
tary-rant-masking-fears-with-mueller-bashing (quoting Giuliani: "This isn't a search for the
truth. It's a witch hunt. This is what is wrong with these special prosecutors and independent
counsels. They think they are God. They seemed to want to prosecute people at any cost,
including the cost of ethical behaviour [sic] and the rights of people"). For a view that Giuli-
ani himself acted unethically in his public commentary, see Ellen C. Brotman, Advice for the
President's New Lawyer: There's a Rule for That, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, June 15, 2018 (as-
serting that Giuliani's claim that Mueller is trying to "frame" the President is legally and
factually baseless, and observing: "Giuliani's statements accusing a high-ranking Depart-
ment of Justice official implicate at least two Rules of Professional Conduct: Rule 4.1(a),
which prohibits making a false statement of material fact to a third person and Rule 8.4 (d)
[sic], which prohibits conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.").
23. Charles M. Blow, Trump Reeks of Fear, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2018, at A21 (quoting
Giuliani's statement o CNN interviewer Dana Bash: "Of course, we have to do it in defending
the president [sic]. We are defending-to a large extent, remember, Dana, we are defending
here, it is for public opinion, because eventually the decision here is going to be impeach, not
impeach. Members of Congress, Democrat and Republican, are going to be informed a lot by
their constituents. So, our jury is the American-as it should be-is the American people.").
24. See, e.g., Judy Woodruff & John King, White House Accuses Starr of Abuse of Power
(CNN Worldview broadcast Feb. 24, 1998, 6:23 PM) (quoting public statement issued by
Starr's office regarding its investigation).
25. See Gershman, supra note 4, at 1193-96.
26. See id. at 1194.
27. See, e.g., Nancy Blodgett, Press-sensitive: Prosecutors' U e ofMedia Hit, 71 A.B.A. J.
17, 17 (1985) (quoting judicial administrator: "Giuliani is a classic illustration of a prosecutor
who has disregarded the rules .... He's developed it into a new art form, revealing all sorts
of things he should not and treating indictments like convictions."); Alexander Stille, A Dy-
namic Prosecutor Captures the Headlines, NAT'L L.J., June 17, 1985, at 2. ("Recently, prom-
inent members of the New York bar have begun to criticize Mr. Giuliani sharply for conduct-
ing trial by press conference. The local bar association responded to the criticisms by opening
an investigation into the abuse of pretrial publicity."). Giuliani's controversial use of the
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used his position as U.S. Attorney as a springboard to become a
candidate for the New York City mayoralty. His exploitation of the
media became a model for later prosecutors with higher ambitions.
The criticisms underscored the difficulty of determining a prosecu-
tor's motivation for speaking in the public media-and, in particu-
lar, whether the motivation is to serve a law enforcement interest
or primarily to advance the prosecutor's own reputation and career.
Although the Model Rules of Professional Conduct leave prosecu-
tors room to speak extra-judicially, some prosecutors have skirted,
if not crossed, the lines drawn by the rules. One noted example was
Attorney General John Ashcroft's public assertion in September
2001 that three men who had been arrested in Detroit on terrorist-
related charges were suspected of having advanced knowledge of
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.28 Ashcroft's statement
contravened a judicial gag order and had no factual basis.29 Alt-
hough Ashcroft later withdrew his statement, he was undeterred;
his later, similar transgressions led to a contempt motion and a ju-
dicial admonition.30 And, notably, the arrested men's convictions
were eventually set aside.3 1 Another prominent example of over-
reaching was U.S. Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald's 2008 press confer-
media was not limited to his and his prosecutors' press conferences. He was also criticized
for arranging so-called "perp walks" in which journalists were tipped off to defendants' ar-
rests so that they could take and publish photographs or videos. Ryan Hagglund, Constitu-
tional Protections Against the Harms to Suspects in Custody Stemming from Perp Walks, 7
MISS. L.J. 1757, 1766 (2012). Giuliani's office was accused of leaking information to the press
through off-the-record communications. Joanne Armstrong Brandwood, Note, You Say "Fair
Trial" and I Say "Free Press" British and American Approaches to Protecting Defendants'
Rights in High Profile Trials, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1412, 1449 (2000) (discussing defendants'
accusation that the office "use[d] publicity as a prosecutorial weapon, carefully timing the
disclosures to 'pressure' defendants, witnesses, and those under investigation") (quoting
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion of Michael R. Milken and Lowell J. Milken for
Contempt Sanctions and Other Relief Based upon the Government's Numerous Unlawful
Leaks to the Press at 2, United States v. Milken, 759 F. Supp. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (No. S 89
Cr. 41 (KMW)) (on file with the New York University Law Review)).
28. See United States v. Koubriti, 305 F. Supp. 2d 723, 744 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
29. Id. at 745; Peter Margulies, Above Contempt?: Regulating Government Overreaching
in Terrorism Cases, 34 SW. U. L. REV. 449, 481-83 (2005).
30. Koubriti, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 757-66.
31. See United States v. Koubriti, 336 F. Supp. 2d 676, 681-82 (E.D. Mich. 2004); Bennett
L. Gershman, How Juries Get it Wrong-Anatomy of the Detroit Terror Case, 44 WASHBURN
L.J. 327, 330 (2005); see also Malanchuk, supra note 11, at 246-48; Jeffrey Rosen, John Ash-
croft's Permanent Campaign, ATLANTIC (Apr. 2004), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/
archive/2004/04/john-ashcroft-s-permanent-campaign/302926/. Ashcroft was also criticized
for public comments regarding the then-pending terrorist prosecution of John Walker Lind.
See Brown, supra note 10, at 127-28.
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ence announcing the indictment of Illinois Governor Rod Blago-
jevich, at which Fitzgerald remarked that "Lincoln [would] roll over
in his grave."
32
More recently, U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara drew criticism for his
statements in a press conference, a press release, a news interview,
tweets, and a law school speech relating to a corruption case against
the Speaker of the New York State Assembly.33 In the district
court's characterization, Bharara "bundle[d] together unproven al-
legations... with broader commentary on corruption and a lack of
transparency in certain aspects of New York State politics."3 4 Pro-
fessor Bennett Gershman charged that Bharara's vilification of the
defendant's character and proclamation of his guilt-such as Bha-
rara's assertion that the defendant "corruptly profit[ed] from [the]
tremendous personal fortune h  amassed through the abuse of his
political power"-prejudiced the fairness of the upcoming trial.
3 5
While not going so far, the district judge in Silver found the prose-
cutor's statements to be "of concern" and "problematic," rejected the
prosecutor's defense of some as "pure sophistry," and "cautioned
that this case is to be tried in the courtroom and not in the press.136
Third, the Mueller case study offers a contrast between Mueller's
extra-judicial silence and his intra-judicial words and deeds. Both
his team's work product and the manner in which they produce it
spoke volumes, and their significance was amplified by the public
media. Mueller's office had little need to offer explanations of fil-
ings and actions that might be opaque, or to provide sound bites in
order to attract public interest, because the investigation attracted
ample public discussion and analysis in response to every public
aspect of its work-often in response to the prosecutors' momentary
quiescence. Legally trained commentators appearing in various
public media eagerly explicated and analyzed Mueller's every move.
Although Mueller's office's judicial filings and appearances did
not afford an opportunity to respond expressly and immediately to
every public criticism or misconception, his office's work offered
many implicit responses. For example, Mueller's office answered
32. Levenson, supra note 11, at 1023-24 (quoting Ill. Governor Arrested on Corruption
Charges, NPR (Dec. 9, 2008, 4:00 PM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?sto-
ryld=98046264). Fitzgerald later expressed regret for the remark. Fitzgerald Regrets "Lin-
coln'Blagojevich Comment, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 24, 2012.
33. United States v. Silver, 103 F. Supp. 3d 370, 373-75 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
34. Id. at 378-79.
35. Bennett L. Gershman, Mouthing Off, SLATE (Mar. 2, 2015, 1:39 PM), https://slate.
com/news-and-politics/2015/03/preet-bharara-on-sheldon-silver-the-prosecutor-could-preju-
dice-a-jury.html.
36. Silver, 103 F. Supp. 3d at 379, 379 n.8, 382.
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broad accusations that it was engaged in a "witch hunt" by amass-
ing indictments and convictions, including convictions of powerful
men who had been Trump aides: Trump's former national security
advisor, Michael Flynn; Trump's personal lawyer, Michael Cohen;
Trump's campaign consultant, Paul Manafort; and Trump's foreign
policy advisor, George Papadopoulos.37 The guilty pleas and, in
Manafort's case, jury verdict, showed that Mueller's investigation
was uprooting crimes, not fabricating them.
Mueller's office has also responded implicitly to assertions that it
was partisan or, in Trump's word, "conflicted.'38 Although Mueller
is himself a Republican, his team was said to be comprised princi-
pally of Democrats working to advance their partisan political pref-
erences.39 By staying out of the spotlight, Mueller and his team
avoided the impression that they were over-zealous, expressing
their own personal preferences, or acting to promote their own per-
ceived interests; they implicitly conveyed that, to the contrary, they
were professionals, conducting their work in accordance with pro-
fessional norms-that, like conventional prosecutors, they were
simply "following the evidence" and the law.
Mueller's judicial filings also provided an opportunity to respond
to some of his critics' more specific claims. Most significantly,
Trump and his supporters asserted repeatedly as the investigation
progressed that his associates' crimes had nothing to do with him.4 0
That claim was implicitly answered by Mueller's filings in Michael
Cohen's case.41 The charging instrument (a criminal "information"
rather than an indictment), to which Cohen pleaded guilty, alleged
that Cohen lied to Congress about the proposed development of
Trump properties in Moscow, including about the timing and extent
of Trump's involvement in the project.4 2 He did so, the document
said, in order to "minimize [the] links between the Moscow Project
and [Trump]"-to whom the document referred as "Individual 1"-
37. See Special Counsel's Office, supra note 3.
38. Gabriella Mufioz, Trump: Robert Mueller is a 'Conflicted Prosecutor Gone Rogue',
WASH. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/nov/27/donald-
trump-robert-mueller-is-a-conflicted-prosec/.
39. See Louis Jacobson, Fact-Checking Donald Trump's Claims About Democrats on Rob-
ert Mueller's Team, POLITIFACT (Mar. 21, 2018, 5:03 PM), https://www.politifact.com/truth-
o-meter/statements/2018/mar/2 1/donald-trump/fact-checking-donald-trumps-claims-about-
Mueller/.
40. See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Oct. 30, 2017, 7:25 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/925005659569041409 (Trump tweeted that
Paul Manafort was indicted for acts predating his campaign).
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and to "give the false impression that the Moscow Project ended be-
fore 'the Iowa caucus."'43 By lying, it was alleged, Cohen "hope[d]
[to] limit[] the ongoing Russia investigations."
44
Fourth, there is a contrast between the amount of information
that Mueller's office publicly revealed in court, little by little and
case by case, and the far greater amount it evidently amassed over
the course of its investigation, out of the public eye and under the
cloak of grand jury secrecy.45 To the extent that Mueller's office
obtained grand jury testimony and documentary evidence pursuant
to grand jury subpoena, criminal procedure rules generally required
the office to protect witnesses' privacy by keeping the evidence se-
cret until it is to be used in judicial proceedings.46 Even to the ex-
tent that the law does not tie prosecutors' hands, the public interest
in the effectiveness of ongoing criminal investigations, as well as
fairness to witnesses and others, ordinarily impels prosecutors to
preserve secrecy.
47
Staying out of the public media is consistent with Department of
Justice regulation and policy, even if not compelled by it. Under
the Department's regulations, when Mueller completed his work as
Special Counsel, he was required to submit to the Attorney General
a confidential report explaining his decisions to prosecute or not
prosecute cases.48  In the interim, he was required to provide the
Attorney General annual budget requests49 and notify the Attorney
43. Id.
44. Id. Later, implicitly responding to the suggestion that investigators had tricked or
pressured Michael Flynn into lying to them, Mueller's sentencing memo made clear that
Flynn had no excuse for lying to the investigators, as Flynn was then forced to concede in
court. See Eric Tucker & Chad Day, Judge Scolds Former Trump Aide; Flynn's Sentencing
for Lying to the FBI Delayed Until March, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 19, 2018, at ClI.
45. See Jennifer Rubin, Distinguished Person of 2018: His Results Speak for Themselves,
WASH. POST (Dec. 30, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2018/12/30/distin-
guished-person-his-results-speak-themselves/?utm term=.93dlb0377949 (observing: "[Mue-
ller] has operated without fanfare or leaks. His court filings have repeatedly surprised on-
lookers, reminding us we know a fraction of what Mueller and his prosecutors have uncov-
ered.").
46. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2).
47. Prosecutors customarily cite these public interests in opposing the expansion of crim-
inal defendants' rights to broader discovery in criminal cases. See Bruce A. Green, Federal
Criminal Discovery Reform: A Legislative Approach, 64 MERCER L. REV. 639, 649 (2013) (not-
ing that in arguing against expanding discovery, "[t]he government typically relies [on] ...
primarily, the need to protect public safety and prevent obstruction of justice"). It might
seem hard for prosecutors to defend disclosures of non-public information in the public media
while maintaining the need to keep non-public information out of the hands of indicted de-
fendants who may need to information to defend themselves at trial or to make informed
decisions regarding whether to plead guilty.
48. 28 C.F.R. § 600.8(c) (2019).
49. Id. § 600.8(a)(2).
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General of significant events.50 But no regulation or policy requires
reporting directly to the public through press releases, interviews,
or other means. There is a regulation concerning a Special Coun-
sel's "conduct and accountability," but it does not presuppose that
"accountability" requires public transparency.51 Rather, the regu-
lation focuses on the Special Counsel's accountability to the Attor-
ney General: it requires the Special Counsel to comply with the De-
partment's "rules, regulations, procedures, practices and policies,"
obligates the Special Counsel to answer the Attorney General's
questions about investigative and prosecutorial decisions, and sub-
jects the Special Counsel to discipline or removal by the Attorney
General.
52
There is nothing to suggest hat Mueller's investigation and pros-
ecutions, or that the public interest in general, were disadvantaged
by his unwillingness to discuss his cases in the public media.53 His
supporters seemed to admire his restraint, and even his critics did
not complain about it. Although prosecutors sometimes assume
that a strong public presence will encourage witnesses to come for-
ward, or that a fearsome public presence will encourage reluctant
witnesses to cooperate, Mueller's office appeared to have more ef-
fective tools to identify potential witnesses and secure their cooper-
ation. These included FBI investigators, grand jury subpoenas, and
access to search warrants and immunity and compulsion orders. To
the extent that there is a public interest in keeping criminal inves-
tigations and prosecutions in the public consciousness in order to
deter future wrongdoing, that interest also seemed to be served
without press conferences and interviews by Mueller and his staff.
No one could suggest that, by keeping its own counsel, Mueller's
office kept its work out of the media. Public discussion of the ongo-
ing Russia investigation was virtually continuous. If anything, his
office's secrecy fueled public discussion, allowing commentators to
speculate exhaustively and without any contradiction from Mueller
about what his office may have learned, may be doing, and may be
likely to do next.
50. Id. § 600.8(b). Regarding this obligation, see UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL §
1-7.700 (U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE 1988).
51. 28 C.F.R. § 600.7.
52. Id.
53. See David Zurawik, Trump vs. Mueller: Our National Cliffhanger, BALT. SUN, Dec.
23, 2018, at El ("Mueller, without saying a word on cable TV or firing off a single tweet, now
has a starring role equal to Trump's. It's tempting to think Trump is fighting a media war
while Mueller is quietly doing his job, but the special counsel has proved to possess an un-
canny sense of timing in the way he speaks through indictments and court filings.").
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Fifth, there is a marked contrast between Mueller's ordinary
daily reticence and his office's rare public disclosure. In January
2019, an online news outlet, Buzzfeed, reported that, according to
unidentified government officials, Mueller's office had obtained wit-
ness statements and documentary evidence corroborating Michael
Cohen's assertion that President Trump had told him to lie to Con-
gress.54 The report elicited a strong public reaction, including from
some members of Congress, because, if true, the Special Counsel
now possessed compelling evidence of obstruction of justice by the
President himself.55  The following day, however, disavowing
Buzzfeed's account, Mueller's spokesman issued a statement:
"Buzzfeed's description of specific statements to the special coun-
sel's office, and characterization of documents and testimony ob-
tained by this office, regarding Michael Cohen's congressional tes-
timony are not accurate."56 Media accounts noted the exceptional
nature of the Special Counsel's Office's departure from its practice
of not commenting publicly on its investigative progress.
57
Perhaps just as notable is how unforthcoming the disclosure was.
The Office did not say in what ways, or to what extent, Buzzfeed's
report was inaccurate-for example, whether Buzzfeed mischarac-
terized Cohen's account; whether Cohen did say that Trump di-
rected him to lie to Congress but his account was contradicted by
other evidence and, as the White House claimed, "categorically
false;" or whether Cohen implicated Trump but the corroborative
testimony and evidence obtained by investigators was simply less
compelling than Buzzfeed's report conveyed.58 Nor did the Office's
statement explain why, on this particular occasion, it elected to
make a public statement, however terse, about the progress of its
investigation in response to a media report59-for example, whether
its objective was to mitigate the political or reputational harm to
the President caused by unwarranted speculation, or whether it
was motivated to redress an improper "leak" by a public official.
Nor did the Office indicate when, in the future, some significance
54. Jason Leopold & Anthony Cormier, President Trump Directed His Attorney Michael
Cohen To Lie To Congress About The Moscow Tower Project, BUZZFEED NEWS (Jan. 18, 2019,
7:23 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/jasonleopold/trump-russia-cohen-moscow-
tower-mueller-investigation.
55. Mark Mazzetti & Sharon LaFraniere, Mueller Statement Disputes Report That
Trump Directed Cohen to Lie, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
01/18/us/politics/buzzfeed-cohen-russia-tower.html (quoting Representatives Castro and
Schiff).
56. Id. (quoting spokesman Peter Carr).
57. See, e.g., id. (referring to the Office's "rare public statement").




can and cannot fairly be read into its nonresponse to public claims
about its investigation.
60
111. WHY SHOULD PROSECUTORS EVER Discuss THEIR CASES IN
THE PUBLIC MEDIA?
Given Mueller's example, one might naturally wonder what legit-
imate reasons prosecutors ever have to hold press conferences, give
interviews and speeches, blog or tweet about the work, or otherwise
discuss their cases in the public media? The professional iterature
assumes that there are sometimes legitimate reasons for lawyers,
including prosecutors, to speak extra-judicially. For prosecutors in
particular, the justifications are not well-elaborated.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct themselves do not say
much about when lawyers generally, and prosecutors particularly,
should discuss their cases in the media. The rules are designed to
be enforced by attorney disciplinary authorities, so the rules focus
on circumstances in which lawyers may not speak extra-judicially.
6 1
To a significant extent, the rules' line-drawing is influenced by the
First Amendment right to free speech, which requires a state to
have a substantial justification before restricting public discussion
of legal proceedings and to define the area of forbidden speech with
sufficient particularity to avoid chilling speech that is constitution-
ally protected.6 2 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct allow
lawyers considerable room to comment publicly on their cases, be-
cause doing so does not necessarily threaten the fairness of criminal
proceedings or otherwise risk serious harm, and because it is hard
to draft with precision in order to capture the situations where law-
yers' public comments are prejudicial while avoiding the possibility
of chilling protected speech. The rule drafters did not mean to en-
courage lawyers to speak whenever the rules allow them to do so.
6 3
To the extent that the professional iterature identifies legitimate
reasons for private lawyers to speak in the public media, those ra-
60. See id.
61. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.6, 3.8(f) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2018); see also
generally Brown, supra note 10, at 108-12 (discussing "permissible areas of comment" under
Rule 3.6).
62. See Catherine Cupp Theisen, Comment, The New Model Rule 3.6: An Old Pair of
Shoes, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 837, 847-52 (1996) (discussing Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501
U.S. 1030 (1991), and the ABA's amendment of Rule 3.6 in its aftermath).
63. See, e.g., Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1058 ("A profession which takes just pride in these tra-
ditions may consider them disserved if lawyers use their skills and insight to make untested
allegations in the press instead of in the courtroom. But constraints of professional respon-
sibility and societal disapproval will act as sufficient safeguards in most cases.").
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tionales do not necessarily apply equally to prosecutors. In partic-
ular, criminal defense lawyers might legitimately speak in the me-
dia to counterbalance the negative portrayal and public discussion
of a defendant resulting from an indictment. The objective is to
offset the jury venire's unfair preconceptions and to redress the
diminution of the client's reputation in the community. This was
the defense lawyer's reason for discussing his client's case in Gentile
v. State Bar of Nevada, where the Court struck down Nevada's rule
restricting lawyers from discussing their pending cases.6 4 In his
plurality opinion, Justice Kennedy acknowledged that "in some cir-
cumstances press comment is necessary to protect the rights of the
client and prevent abuse of the courts."6 5 This rationale is inappli-
cable to prosecutors, who do not have a client whose reputation is
at stake and do not have to contend with any publicity that may
undermine the presumption of innocence. For prosecutors, discuss-
ing a pending case is more likely to enhance unfair prejudice than
to counter it.66
The rule drafters nevertheless assumed that it is sometimes use-
ful for prosecutors to discuss their work. As noted, Model Rule of
Professional Conduct Rule 3.8(f) expressly allows the possibility
that a prosecutor, even if heightening public condemnation of the
accused, will nevertheless be serving "a legitimate law enforcement
purpose."'7 But the rule leaves it to prosecutors to decide what a
"law enforcement purpose" is and when one is "legitimate.'"6 8 A
Comment to Model Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 3.6, the rule
restricting prejudicial extra-judicial speech, specifically identifies
only a rare occasion when it may be necessary for prosecutors to
discuss a case in the media.6 9 That is when there is a need to let
the public know that their safety is at risk-for example, that there
is a killer on the loose-and what law enforcement authorities are
doing about the problem.70
The recently updated ABA Criminal Justice Standards on Fair
Trial and Public Discourse offer an equally narrow view.71 These
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Matheson, supra note 11, at 889 (condemning prosecutors' speech to gain a
tactical advantage).
67. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8(f) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2018).
68. See Brown, supra note 10, at 114-15 (discussing the vagueness of the phrase "legiti-
mate law enforcement purpose" in Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8(f)).
69. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.6 cmt. 1.
70. Id. ("The public has a right to know about threats to its safety and measures aimed
at assuring its security.").
71. See generally CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, FAIR TRIAL AND PUBLIC DISCOURSE
(AM. BAR ASS'N 2013).
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standards identify only two kinds of statements by prosecutors
"that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose," namely, "state-
ments reasonably necessary to warn the public of any ongoing dan-
gers that may exist or to quell public fears" and "statements rea-
sonably necessary to obtain public assistance in solving a crime, ob-
taining evidence, or apprehending a suspect or fugitive. '72 The list
of two is not meant to be exclusive.73 But it is hard to see how these
two considerations or others like them might have impelled
Mueller, or other prosecutors in white-collar criminal cases, to hold
a press conference or post on social media.
Like the ABA's rules and standards, the Department of Justice
regulations and internal policies governing federal prosecutors'
communications with the press focus on impermissible communica-
tions.74 The Department has articulated only a vague view of when
it is advisable for prosecutors to discuss their ongoing cases in the
public media. The internal policy says that "[t]here are circum-
stances when media contact may be appropriate after indictment or
other formal charge, but before conviction, '75 and allows prosecu-
tors to assist the news media "[i]n order to promote the aims of law
enforcement, including the deterrence of criminal conduct and the
enhancement of public confidence."76 But the policy is not specific
about the "appropriate" circumstances or about when extrajudicial
speech furthers law enforcement aims.
77
The Department of Justice policy strictly limits the range of per-
missible extrajudicial speech.78 It allows press conferences "only for
significant newsworthy actions, or if an important law enforcement
purpose would be served,' 79 and even then, "communications with
the media should be limited to the information contained in publicly
available material, such as an indictment or other public plead-
ings. °80 Most significantly, the effect of this policy is to bar federal
prosecutors from explaining their decisions not to take investigative
or prosecutorial action and, in particular, their decision not to bring
criminal charges. FBI Director Jim Comey, acting under the au-
thority delegated by Attorney General Loretta Lynch, was criticized
72. Id. at Standard 8-2.2(b)(ii).
73. Rather, the two categories are meant merely to be examples. See id. (endorsing
"statements that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, such as" the two kinds listed).
74. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 50.2(a)(2) (2019) ("[T]he release of information for the purpose
of influencing a trial is, of course, always improper.").
75. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 1-7.700(B) (U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE 1988).
76. Id. § 1-7.710(B).
77. See generally id. §§ 1-7.000-7.900.
78. See generally id.
79. Id. § 1-7.700(A).
80. Id. § 1-7.700(B).
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for contravening this policy when, in the lead-up to the 2016 presi-
dential election, he discussed the decision not to prosecute Hillary
Clinton in connection with her use of a private e-mail server.
81
Tellingly, neither the organized bar's model rules and standards
nor federal prosecutors' internal regulations and rules discuss "ac-
countability" to the public; neither endorses the view that, as a mat-
ter of accountability, prosecutors hould or must speak publicly,
outside the judicial setting, about their ongoing work.82 The com-
ments to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct acknowledge the
public's interest in learning about judicial proceedings in order to
engage in public debate and deliberation regarding the law and le-
gal processes, but they do not encourage or endorse prosecutors' ex-
tra-judicial speech to promote these interests.8 3 Similarly, the De-
partment of Justice acknowledges that its internal policy on confi-
dentiality and media contacts gives weight to "the right of the public
to have access to information about the Department of Justice.'8 4
But nothing suggests that federal prosecutors should, or must, re-
sort to the public media out of respect for this right. At most, the
public's "right to know" restricts prosecutors from placing impedi-
ments in the public media's path.8 5 And, as noted, when it comes to
a Special Counsel in particular, the Department of Justice regula-
tions focus on "accountability" to the Attorney General, not the pub-
lic directly.86 On the contrary, the regulation requires the Special
Counsel to deliver a final report in confidence to the Attorney Gen-
eral, who may elect to keep the report confidential.8 7 The arguable
implication is that the Special Counsel may not be accountable to
the public directly.
81. See, e.g., Memorandum from Rod J. Rosenstein, Deputy Attorney General, to the At-
torney General re: "Restoring Public Confidence in the FBI" (May 9, 2017) (https://www.jus-
tice.gov/oip/foia-library/moss/download) ("Compounding the error, the Director ignored an-
other longstanding principle: we do not hold press conferences to release derogatory infor-
mation about the subject of a declined criminal investigation. Derogatory information some-
times is disclosed in the course of criminal investigations and prosecutions, but we never
release it gratuitously.").
82. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.2 (2019); UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL §§ 1-7.000-7.900.
83. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.6 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2018) ("[T]here
are vital social interests served by the free dissemination of information about events having
legal consequences and about legal proceedings themselves," and the public "has a legitimate
interest in the conduct of judicial proceedings, particularly in matters of general public con-
cern. Furthermore, the subject matter of legal proceedings is often of direct significance in
debate and deliberation over questions of public policy.").
84. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 1-7.001.
85. See id. § 1-7.710(A) ("DOJ personnel shall not prevent lawful efforts by the news
media to record or report about a matter, unless by reason of a court order.").
86. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
87. 28 C.F.R. § 600.8(c) (2019).
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IV. DOES PROSECUTORS' ACCOUNTABILITY REQUIRE THEM TO
DISCUSS THEIR CASES IN THE PUBLIC MEDIA?
Do prosecutors have a duty of public accountability that calls on
them to discuss their work in the public media, not just in court?
Ken Starr is not the only one to suggest as much.88 But prosecutors
themselves do not appear to think so: they do not routinely discuss
their cases in the media, and there is no public demand for them to
do so. Prosecutors might plausibly justify their extra-judicial dis-
cussions of cases by citing law enforcement interests such as deter-
rence, the discovery of evidence, and public safety. Prosecutors
might also cite the need to promote public understanding. But they
rarely assert that they have a general duty to hold themselves ac-
countable to the public by updating the public about their work.
It is important to note that "accountability" has no fixed meaning
in this context. Much of the discussion of prosecutors' "accountabil-
ity" focuses on whether prosecutors are complying with their legal
and disciplinary obligations, whether they are otherwise abusing
their power, and whether there are adequate disciplinary processes
and other procedural mechanisms for holding prosecutors account-
able for illegal or abusive conduct.8 9 But the claim that prosecutors
must tell the public what they are doing and why rests on a broader
understanding of accountability-an idea of political accountabil-
ity. The assumption is that prosecutors-especially elected prose-
cutors-must be politically accountable to the public, and that po-
litical accountability presupposes public transparency.90
If one assumes that a prosecutor's job is to exercise authority in
accordance with public preferences, then political accountability
might presuppose much greater public transparency than is cur-
rently the norm.91 Prosecutors might be expected to explain their
88. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 10, at 125 ("Prosecutors have an obligation as public
officials to keep the citizenry reasonably informed regarding criminal matters.").
89. See, e.g., Bruce Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability 2.0, 92
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 51, 51 (2016) ("Given prosecutors' extraordinary power, it is important
that they be effectively regulated and held accountable for misconduct.") (footnote omitted);
Bidish Sarma, Using Deterrence Theory to Promote Prosecutorial Accountability, 21 LEWIS &
CLARKL. REV. 573, 579-82 (2017).
90. See Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat
of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 397 (2001) ("In most cases, the mechanisms that purport to
give the general public the ability to hold prosecutors accountable are ineffective and mean-
ingless. Most citizens know very little about the practices and policies of their local prosecu-
tor.").
91. See, e.g., Daniel Epps, Adversarial Asymmetry in the Criminal Process, 91 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 762, 822 (2016) ("[I]f our system of broad prosecutorial discretion is in theory supposed
to produce results that accord with the public's preferences, in practice it has two significant
and related accountability deficits. First, prosecutors' broad discretion gives them a tremen-
dous amount of power, and some of the ways they exercise that power are troubling. Second,
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public actions-for example, why they initiated an investigation,
used a particular investigative technique, initiated charges, or ac-
cepted a plea bargain. They might also be expected to identify and
explain roads not taken-for example, why they declined to inves-
tigate, eschewed particular investigative measures, or closed an in-
vestigation without bringing charges. Prosecutors rarely explain
their decisions, and they rarely even disclose the fact that they have
decided not to act in particular ways. But without knowing what
prosecutors decided to do, or not to do, and why, the public could
not hold prosecutors politically accountable for implementing pop-
ular preferences.
If prosecutors' job is not to carry out the public will in individual
cases, but to act competently in accordance with the law and pro-
fessional norms, then it is less obvious that prosecutors must dis-
cuss their work extra-judicially, rather than speaking only through
their judicial filings and statements. To be politically accountable
as a public official does not invariably require reporting to the pub-
lic. National security officials and military leaders are accountable,
but they are accountable to select high-ranking executive and leg-
islative branch officials with high-level security clearance.92 The
effectiveness of national security and military officials presupposes
a high level of secrecy; public transparency would impede, if not de-
stroy, their effectiveness. Likewise, judges-some of whom are
elected-are expected to be accountable in general terms, but this
does not mean following the public's preferences in individual cases
nor does it require explaining their work extra-judicially in the pub-
lic media.9
3
Like national security officials, military officials, and judges,
prosecutors engage in work that demands a high level of both con-
because the conception of the public interest that prosecutors are supposed to serve is fuzzy
and amorphous, it is difficult for the public to effectively monitor and control prosecutorial
behavior."); see also id. at 792 ("[T]he current system of prosecutorial discretion and account-
ability produces behavior by prosecutors (the agents) that diverge from what the public (the
principal) would desire, at least acting rationally."); Ronald F. Wright & Marc L. Miller, The
Worldwide Accountability Deficit for Prosecutors, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1587, 1589 (2010)
("A responsible exercise of power means judgments that are consistent with current public
preferences and with fundamental, long-term legal principles. In short, the prosecutor must
be accountable both to the people and to their laws.").
92. See generally, e.g., Gregory S. McNeal, Targeted Killing and Accountability, 102 GEO.
L.J. 681 (2014).
93. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.10 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2010); Nancy Gertner,




fidentiality and independence from political and popular prefer-
ences.94 Robust public reporting of their internal decision-making
and nonjudicial actions would undermine prosecutors' effectiveness
and potentially subject them to popular pressure that would influ-
ence them to act unprofessionally. Public disclosure at times would
also be contrary to the interests in respecting witnesses' privacy, in
avoiding embarrassment of individuals who are entitled to a legal
presumption of innocence, and in promoting fair criminal processes.
Mueller's heavily redacted public filing in connection with Paul
Manafort's sentencing vividly depicted the competing public inter-
ests in confidentiality and transparency: the public version of the
sealed submission deleted the names of witnesses, the names of
other third parties, and significant amounts of information on the
subject of Manafort's alleged false statements to the prosecutors.
95
And, as Brett Kavanaugh observed twenty years ago, even the idea
that a special appointed prosecutor's final report might be made
public at the conclusion of a government corruption investigation is
contrary to conventional federal prosecutorial practice and at odds
with strong interests that favor confidentiality.
96
The idea of prosecutorial accountability is undeveloped both the-
oretically and legally in the United States. There is no clear under-
standing of (1) what it means for U.S. prosecutors to be accountable,
(2) whether accountability presupposes accountability to the public,
(3) if so, whether public accountability necessitates transparency,
and (4) if so, to what extent.97 While prosecutors may elect to dis-
cuss their work publicly (within limits), and the public may demand
94. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Can the President Control the Depart-
ment ofJustice?, 70 ALA. L. REV. 1, 73-74 (2018) ("Preserving prosecutorial independence is
one way to ensure the disinterested and even-handed application f criminal law."); Bruce A.
Green & Alafair S. Burke, The Community Prosecutor: Questions of Professional Discretion,
47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 285, 315-16 (2012) ("[I]n the context of much of prosecutors' tradi-
tional work-namely, the prosecution of individual cases-there are practical and ethical
limits on the ability to make decision making transparent and respond to community input.
Discretionary decision making is pervasive; prosecutors would not have time to become
transparent and accountable in every individual case even if it were desirable and proper to
do so. Prosecutors are limited by the interests in investigative secrecy and in fairness to the
accused in their ability to discuss publicly the facts relevant to charging decisions and other
discretionary decisions or the reasons for their decisions.").
95. See Greg Walters, Mueller Just Released Nearly 200 Pages of Evidence Against Man-
afort. Read it Here, VICE NEWS (Jan. 15, 2019), https://news.vice.com/en-us/article/gy7zd4/
mueller-just-released-nearly-2 0 0-pages-of-evidence-against-manafortread-ithere.
96. Brett M. Kavanaugh, The President and the Independent Counsel, 86 GEO. L.J. 2133,
2156 (1998) ("As a general proposition, a public report is a mistake. It violates the basic norm
of secrecy in criminal investigations, it adds time and expense to the investigation, and it
often is perceived as a political act. It also misconceives the goals of the criminal process.").
97. Prosecutors have some accountability to the courts, both because they are lawyers
licensed by the courts and subject to discipline and because they appear as advocates before
the courts subject to judicial oversight and sanction. As a legal matter, however, courts have
288 Vol. 57
Court of Public Opinion
greater transparency, there is no professional or popular under-
standing, much less a legal understanding, that prosecutors must
disclose any otherwise nonpublic aspects of their work. Certainly,
nothing in the nature of prosecuting demands that prosecutors
should explain their work directly to the public. The public un-
doubtedly has an interest in knowing what public prosecutors are
doing, both in particular cases and in general, but the public has no
legal "right to know" that implies a reciprocal legal obligation of
disclosure by prosecutors. The constitutional commitment to open
criminal proceedings does not imply a commitment to open prose-
cutors' files. Although prosecutors' visible work in public proceed-
ings is only the tip of the iceberg, the successful implementation of
criminal law does not require disclosing those aspects of prosecu-
tors' work that do not surface in public proceedings. Prosecutors
outside the United States conduct their work successfully without
generally accounting to the public,98 and so can United States pros-
ecutors.99
Moreover, to the extent that prosecutors currently resort to the
public media, they cannot fairly claim thereby to be holding them-
selves accountable. Prosecutors are too selective in their public
communications,100 which are unlikely to offset pervasive misinfor-
mation from other sources.10 1 And it is doubtful whether prosecu-
tors' public commentary could ever enable the public to make a well-
minimal oversight of prosecutors' decisions regarding whether to investigate or prosecute
particular cases and no oversight of prosecutors' general charging policies and practices. See
generally Bruce A. Green, Disciplinary Regulation of Prosecutors as a Remedy for Abuses of
Prosecutorial Discretion: A Descriptive and Normative Analysis, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 143
(2016). Courts have substantially more authority to establish standards governing prosecu-
tors' conduct in their advocacy role and to enforce the standards both through trial judges'
oversight of individual cases and through the disciplinary process. As a practical matter,
judicial oversight of prosecutors' advocacy is principally the work of trial judges. It is "con-
ventional wisdom . . . that disciplinary authorities do not effectively regulate prosecutors,"
id. at 144, although there have been recent signs of change. See generally Green & Yaroshef-
sky, supra note 89.
98. See Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Prosecutors as Judges, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1413, 1475 (2010) ("Unlike their American counterparts, . . . European prosecutors have no
immediate structural accountability to the general public .... Any political accountability is
... indirect.").
99. Indeed, in the UK, discussions in the public media by anyone about ongoing cases are
sharply curtailed. See generally JUDICIAL COLLEGE, REPORTING RESTRICTIONS IN THE
CRIMINAL COURTS (2016), https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/reporting-
restrictions-guide-may-2016-2.pdf.
100. Cf. Davis, supra note 90 ("In most cases, the mechanisms that purport to give the
general public the ability to hold prosecutors accountable are ineffective and meaningless.
Most citizens know very little about the practices and policies of their local prosecutor.").
101. Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 959, 983 (2009) ("Members of the public have sparse and unreliable infor-
mation about how well prosecutors perform. Most public information about criminal justice
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informed assessment of prosecutors' work. Professional rules and
norms limit what prosecutors can say outside court about ongoing
cases.102 But even if that were not true, prosecutors' self-interest
would limit them, as would their role as advocates. Prosecutors do
not now, and never will, provide an unselective, objective account of
their current work. They and their offices' self-interests in winning
public approval motivate them to discuss their successes and to ad-
vocate for the legitimacy of their decisions, not to discuss failures
and self-doubts. Their interest as advocates in defending their con-
duct from legal challenges likewise militates against candor. Be-
cause prosecutors control the information held within their offices,
so that the public cannot extract information beyond whatever pros-
ecutors disclose on their own initiative, the public has no means to
obtain a more complete and balanced account.103 When prosecutors
present their case in the court of public opinion, no one with inside
knowledge can present the other side. Prosecutors' public speech is
less likely to serve accountability than to distort public understand-
ing by providing an incomplete, misleading and altogether too rosy
perspective on their work.
Finally, insofar as one believes that, to be politically accountable,
prosecutors must make their decision-making more transparent, it
does not necessarily follow that prosecutors must discuss their work
in the public media,104 or that, in discussing their work in the me-
dia, they must discuss ongoing cases. Prosecutors can explain how
comes from crime dramas or novels, reality television shows, or sensational, unrepresenta-
tive news stories. As a result, the public suffers from chronic misperceptions about how the
criminal justice system actually works.").
102. See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text (discussing Model Rules of Professional
Conduct 3.6 and 3.8(f)).
103. See generally Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Proce-
dure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 923-31 (2006).
104. For example, as alternative means of promoting public accountability, Stephanos Bi-
bas has discussed the possibilities of "[g]iving victims a greater role as stakeholders," Bibas,
supra note 101, at 993, and treating criminal defendants as stakeholders with a voice in the
system, id. at 994-96. Others have discussed the utility of engaging the community in pros-
ecutors' decisions-not about whether to investigate or prosecute particular cases, but about
general problems and approaches, see, e.g., Green & Burke, supra note 94, at 291-92 ("Com-
munity prosecutors typically work with members of the community to identify recurring, on-
going criminal justice problems (drug dealing, graffiti, vagrancy) and then work in tandem
with community representatives and agencies to address these problems through a project,
policy, or strategy, often involving nontraditional methods."), while at the same time caution-
ing about potential pitfalls to community engagement, see id. at 303-04 ("But to rely on com-
munity participation as a means of improving prosecutorial discretion is to assume that the
community is sufficiently democratic, informed, and powerful to ensure that community pros-
ecution policies serve the community interest, but not so powerful as to override other pros-
ecutorial priorities. Without participation by representative, well-informed, and empowered
stakeholders, there is a risk that law enforcement may co-opt the politically popular rhetoric
of 'community,' simply to advance its own agenda. At the same time, trusting the community
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they generally make decisions-for example, what decision-making
principles they adopt, what deliberative processes they establish,
and how they ensure that their principles and processes are actu-
ally employed.10 5 Increased public discussions of prosecutors' work,
even at a level of generality, would encourage better decision-mak-
ing, if only by making prosecutors' offices more self-conscious.1 0 6 In
jurisdictions where prosecutors are elected, greater transparency
would also enhance the public's ability to make informed decisions
in the electoral process.10 7 Although such discussions might not al-
low the public to judge whether prosecutors are honestly applying
the standards that they claim to apply, prosecutors will likely never
disclose their internal processes in individual cases completely and
candidly enough to allow the public to sit as judges over prosecutors'
decision making. Prosecutors, like judges, can be transparent only
to a degree. They can never be as forthcoming with the public as
private lawyers are expected to be in communicating with individ-
ual and entity clients.
V. CONCLUSION
Prosecutors, as public officials, are expected to be accountable to
the public. One might take the view that prosecutors' accountabil-
ity presupposes transparency, which, in turn, includes an obligation
to disclose and explain their investigative and prosecutorial deci-
sions to the public as they are being implemented. By that stand-
ard, Special Counsel Robert Mueller would appear to have been
among the least accountable prosecutors, given his unwillingness
to comment about his work in the public media.
to oversee the exercise of prosecutorial discretion creates a risk that community-based voices
will co-opt prosecutorial values.").
105. Green & Burke, supra note 94, at 315 ("[T]raditional prosecution-even applying re-
active, retributive models of punishment-might benefit from engagement with voices out-
side the prosecutor's office. As scholars have previously noted, prosecutorial transparency
increases public confidence in prosecutors and courts and enhances the legitimacy of the
criminal justice system."); Wright & Miller, supra note 91, at 1600 ("An accountable prose-
cutor's office can keep citizens informed about its progress in reaching goals such as rough
equality across cases and transparency in decision-making. Ultimately, an accountable pros-
ecutor does more than prevent misconduct: Accountability creates faith and trust in the
workings of prosecutors, courts, and government more generally.").
106. Cf. Bibas, supra note 101; Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Rethinking Prosecutors'
Conflicts of Interest, 58 B.C. L. Rev. 463, 537 (2017) (arguing that prosecutors should be
taught to deliberate more self-consciously in negotiating the tension between the roles as
advocate and minister of justice).
107. See, e.g., Green & Burke, supra note 94, at 315 ("Public elections of prosecutors would




In truth, Mueller was among the most accountable prosecutors,
however. To the extent Mueller worked outside public scrutiny, he
collaborated with a team of experienced government lawyers and
investigators who presumably justified their decisions to each
other. To the extent his work resulted in public filings and appear-
ances and other publicly visible actions in the context of judicial
proceedings, his work was heavily scrutinized and analyzed in the
public media. Mueller made periodic reports to the Attorney Gen-
eral, who had the authority to remove him for cause. And when his
work ended, Mueller was required to explain his decisions in a re-
port to the Attorney General, who could make the report public.
As Mueller's example shows, prosecutors can be accountable
without speaking to reporters or posting on social media about their
ongoing work. At the same time, to the extent that other prosecu-
tors, taking a different approach, discuss their own ongoing work,
they are rarely doing so to promote accountability; their public com-
ments rarely advance the public's ability to influence prosecutors'
work based on enhanced public understanding. Further, given dis-
ciplinary restrictions on prosecutors' extra-judicial speech, counter-
vailing law enforcement interests in preserving secrecy, and prose-
cutors' own self-interest, prosecutors' public discussions of pending
cases could never significantly advance accountability.
Of course, Mueller's example is anomalous. Prosecutors' work
rarely, if ever, evokes comparable public interest. And prosecutors
do not ordinarily have to report up, much less so extensively. That
means that prosecutors must find other, perhaps more creative,
ways to advance public understanding of their work, and that the
public must be more assertive in holding prosecutors accountable
by other means.
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